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A discussion of meaning involves questions of context and power in several senses. The recent debate abou t "Orientalism" has largely been about how Westerners in various ways created a mysterious world of "the Orient.'" In so doing they came to assume a power over the peoples they described by 
imposing meanings from alien contexts upon them. In contrast to the objective, scien­
tific, rational West a strange, mystical, irrational Orient was born. The essays in this 
volume attempt to breakaway from the assumptions behind this approach, and explore 
possible styles of research which do less injustice to the peoples with whom-rather 
than on whom-we work. 
The sweeping and misleading generalizations too often made by students of 
Southeast Asian societies commonly have their roots in a superficial understanding of 
the history, culture, and linguistic complexities of what they profess to explain. A 
scarcely less dangerous tendency has been to constitute an imaginary "object of study" 
which displaces Southeast Asians to some timeless, distant world.' So we have focused 
on the impact their neighbors, the colonial powers, contemporary economic and polit­
ical relations, and their own historical experiences have had, the better to understand 
the forms which the discourses of Southeast Asian peoples have assumed . 
The title of the volume is itself suggestive of the type of problem we are addressing. 
"Southeast Asia" does not "exist" any more than terms like "context" or "meaning" 
have any very clear or unambiguous sense, other than within a particular framework. 
Southeast Asia is a recent, externally defined, political invention and denotes no exclu­
sive internally bounded entity, geographically, ethnically or culturally..' It is merely a 
convenient label to refer to one part of the globe in relation to others . 
This said, however, there are senses in which such a regional focus is not entirely 
arbitrary. Long before jayavarman 11 returned from java to found the Angkor dynasty 
in Cambodia, there seems to have been extensive travel , mutual influence through 
trade and conquest, and cultural adaptation around the South China and nearby seas. 
There has been a long history of conscious borroWing, within as well as without the 
region, as jacob makes clear in her essay. Such influences may perhaps best be seen as 
in opposition, or as supplementary, to the dynamics of local cultures. With the growth 
of Western imperialism and global trade, more distant centers of power tried to impose 
their ideas upon Southeast Asian societies and change these societies to furth er what 
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they perceived as their own or sometimes the colonized peoples' interes ts. The idea of 
the region, more recently, has served the aim of some Southeast Asian governments to 
represent themselves as having something in Cammon. Others have sought to s tress 
broader extra-regional (and often ideologica l) links, or have taken refuge in mare nar­
rowly interpreted "national identities." It is in the shaping of these processes that we 
are interested . 
If the no tion of a " region" is a fiction (in the sense of "something made") , so may 
be its constituent "societies" or "cultures," which are in no small part outsiders' con­
structions of an amalgam of processes, interpreted and disputed in different ways by 
those involved . Such hypostat iza tion fo llows easily from the common-sense model of 
language, whereby words and sentences have mean ing by corresponding to the actual 
state of affairs in the world. The problem is that much of what people say and do gains 
meaning, not by reference to the world, but by reference to other things which have 
been sa id and done. In other words signi ficance depends upon context. So Correspon­
dence Theory has a rival, or complement, in Coherence or Contextual Theory. Instead 
of analyzing a subject in search of its essential nature, the appeal to context implies a 
focus on relationships, and potentially different perspectives. If the former is of use in 
practical science, the latter comes into its own in interpreting cultural statements and 
actions, which often make little sense in terms of any simple correspondence with the 
world. The difficulty is simply that, whereas it is possible in principle to lay down fairly 
strict conditions for meaning in Correspondence Theory, how is one 10 circumscribe all 
the possible contexts relevant to a contextual approach7 
Contextualizing also raises the delicate issue of the relation between analysts' and 
indigenous frames of reference, and poses the questions: whose fo rmulat ion of rela ­
tions, and whose criteria of relevance, are at stake? People have different representa­
tions (in Goodman's sense)' of relevant context, not just between, but within, cultures. 
Such representations involve power and knowledge in two ways, as Davidson's essay 
shows. The ability to assert, and have one's assertions accepted as legitimate knowl­
edge, are important aspects of power, as Jacob and Taylor sugges t and as I argue below. 
At the same time, the knowledge ava ilable to different groups or persons in a society 
delim its the forms of powe r which are recognized and may be used . 
The question of context becomes mare complex when it is recognized that , in 
importi ng "foreign" ideas, or having them imposed, the political and cultural possibil­
ities are extended. In allowing greater choice in how to contextualize, there emerges a 
double relationship between knowledge and power. In adopting academically fashion­
able criteria for selecting relevant contexts in preference to those used by the partici­
pants themselves, we may be guilty Simultaneously of an act of distortion and a subtle 
kind of epistemological domination. The illustration of these points is an implicit theme 
running through this book. 
At first Sight, the six essays may seem toaddress somewhat different topics. Some 
readers may wish to look only at those which seem pertinent to their own fields . To do 
so wou ld be to miss how far the themes complement and illuminate each other. Toclas­
sify the essays-thiS one on Burmese politics, that one about Vietnamese poetry- is 
to split a complex reality into compartments, an approach from which it was our pur­
pose to suggest an escape. The reason for people interested in literatu re, poli tics, eco­
nomic development, and culture coming together was the sha red realization of how 
simi lar were the kinds of questions we were asking. We feel it would be a mistake to 
lose the richness of the plurality of these views for the sake of prodUCing short-lived 
hypotheses with a semblance of "scientific" comparability. 
This introduction will not therefore attempt to generalize about what might seem 
a common theme, namely how borrowed languages and symbols came, through adap­
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tation, to bring about change in Southeast Asia. Generalization of this kind would mis­
represent what the contributors have sought to achieve . For we have eschewed the 
naive model of "social change" (or "political change") which implies a static system to 
which " change" happens. Societies, polities, and languages are dynamic and contin­
ually being reinterpreted and reevaluated in different contexts . Perhaps one should ask 
not how, or why, change happens but what underlies the impression of continuity. 
All the essays make use of linguistic materials in their analyses. A word of warning 
is therefore necessary against a potential misunderstanding .One can slip into the com­
fortable mistake of seeing language as a transparent medium for picturing truth and 
meaning-language as a kind of container, a conduit for the communication of the 
essence of thought or reality.5 However, as Edelman observes: 
Language ... is not to be conceived as something which conveys meaning by itself. 
Its meanings are always a function of the context from which it issues, of the dis­
parate needs and interests of the audiences involved , and of their respective 
modes of perception. The realistic study of political language and its meaning is 
necessarily a probing not only of dictionaries, nor of word counts, but of the 
diverse response to particular modes of expression of audiences in disparate social 
settings.' 
Thus language may indeed refer; but it may also express a speaker's attitude or 
feelings; it may be prescriptive; it may express shared contact; it may be used to check 
for misunderstanding; and it may be reflexive commentary.' How the different func­
tions of language may be subtly mixed emerges in the various papers. Whatever lan­
guage does, it does not just describe. For descriptions do not just "happen": they are 
asserted, denied, questioned, mused over, and mOre besides, by people in specific sit­
uations. 
If the meaning of language is complicated, so a fortiori is its use in symbolism. One 
of the legacies of the structuralist analysis of symbols, as Sperber has pointed out, is 
that it has "established, all unknowing, that symbols work without meaning.'" Worse, 
symbolism is often appealed to when the analyst can find no criteria which, by his or 
her standards, are rational. It tends thus to be a residual category, an inheritance of the 
Romantics' critique of the Enlightenment's vision.' We would do well to refrain from 
imposing this type of category on peoples who have their own, and different, traditions 
of argumentation. 
The essays collected here offer complementary perspectives which suggest an 
interesting, if unexpected , picture. To draw out what I see as their implications, I shall 
discuss them briefly in an order convenient for exposition. 
Development, the current soubriquet for planned social change, is a Western 
notion shot through with universalist assumptions about evolution, as Demaine brings 
out in his discussion of Thailand . There, successive National Development Plans were 
couched in the to us familiar language of economic development theories. These plans, 
however, have come adrift in the context of Thai economic and political relations, which 
in practice are articulated in terms of cultural presuppositions quite different from 
what those who drafted the plans imagined. Projects and funds are administered 
through ministries which operate as semiautonomous fiefdoms; and relations, what­
ever the formal constitution, are organized in a manner reminiscent of "traditional" 
ties of patronage." A striking characteristic of the elite responsible for implementing 
the development plans is its remoteness from the supposed beneficiaries and its image 
of the latter as "stupid" peasants. Failure of the plans is therefore easily accounted for 
by superiors in terms of their model of their society's membership. Miscommunica­
10 COIl text, Meaning , and Power 
tion, and conflicting paradigms, seem to OCCu r at each point in the chain of command. 
The "objective," or "scientific," language of economic and social development 
planners tends to conceal how critical different epistemological points of view and cul­
tural presuppositions are to communication, or (more often) its lack. At its simplest, 
"development" involves divergent and ambiguous Western models of others' imag­
ined societies and how these must evolve to emulate their creators' self-image or, sti ll 
more condescendingly, attain the lesser goals thought fit for them. Further, ideals or 
plans are interpreted and "adapted" by interes t g roups, typically drawn from poten­
tially rival segments of an elite who proceed according to their idiosyncratic construc­
tions or assertions of what their ow n society is, or ought to be, abou t. The 
miscommunication which often ensues and still passes for "development" stems from 
the imposition, by virtue of economic and political power, of alien models of invented 
Others (to use Foucault' s trenchant term). 
Just how the discourse of development has been shaped by existing power rela­
tions, and modified in the light of apparent failure, is clearly drawn out by Demaine. As 
he notes, "development" is in itself an ambiguous notion , capable of disseminating all 
sorts of readings. According to the ea rJier economic version, reSOurces are its (ocus, 
and success is judged by increases in gross national product. When this model failed 
to achieve the ends sought by some Thai, attention shif ted slowly-by way of curious 
hybrids like " human reSOurce development"-to human and social "progress ." This 
idea treated "development" as "a series of s tages in the process of man's a ttempt to 
realize his poten tia!." 
Demaine demonstrates the ex tent to which these two interpretations of "devel­
opment" in Thailand do not come as isolated concepts but are part of a set of more Or 
less coherent ideas. Each interpretation includes ontological preferences (in other 
words, what aspect of reality or human action should be treated as primary: material 
resources or the satisfaction of needs); a theory of human nature and society; and a 
view of history. Each model postulates some kind of teleologica l account of the way in 
which society Or Man must-if helped by a little pushing-naturally evolve . Dis­
creetly tucked away in most such models is a metaphorical image, which has a habit of 
taking On a life of its own ." So wealth " trickles down" Or threatens to " polarize" rich 
and poor. In the language of progress, ideas like "development" and "society" rapidly 
become reified : a trend with critical political implications. 
Two of the essays examine the borrowing of fore ign words and its implications. 
Jacob shows that there is noth ing new in Cambodians importing and adapting vocab­
ulary from others, often by conscious and deliberate borrowing. In pre-Angkorean and 
Angkorean times, Sanskrit was already used "as the language of pres tige and of liter­
ature. Loan words relating to Jaw, religion, and polities, and abstract ideas in general, 
were absorbed into Khmer." By contrast, la ter borrowings from Thai included "every­
day words obviously chosen for literary effect." In the colonial period , certain words 
seem to have been used more out of necessity than choice, to judge from the st renuous 
efforts of the Cultural Commission set up by the government after independence to 
remove French words from the language. Such sleps were justified by the state as nec­
essa ry for the preservation and advancement of what it portrayed as "Khmer culture ." 
They were also a sign of the independent sta te's attempt to claim to be the arbiter of 
meaning and the origin of power over language as over everything else . 
While Jacob notes the motives behind the borrowing of terms, she is careful not to 
conjecture abou t worlds of " meaning" which such borrowings could be thought to 
imply." Instead she states that "meaning" is used to indicate " the effect wh ich the 
deliberate use of a foreign term may have or have had" at the given time. Such a loosely 
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"Wittgensteinian" approach has the advantage of not committing one a priori to any 
particular function of language . It also avoids the assumption that, in importing alien 
lexical items, the Khmer were necessarily importing ideas with them." For such terms 
were not always used with their original referents and could develop quite distinct con­
notations . For example, where Khmer words were available, to the extent that Sanskrit 
offered a language of prestige, it was not that one could say something different in San­
skrit so much as with Sanskrit. A language of prestige is, of course, a language which 
implies privileged knowledge and therefore power for those who use it as opposed to 
those who do not. Significance seems to lie metalingually in the choice of codes as 
much as in the "meaning" (in a correspondence or referential sense of the word) . Sim­
ilar observations could , without doubt, be made for other Southeast Asian peoples. 
The other essay which concentrates on the borrowing of lexical terms and alien 
concepts, is that by Taylor, whose problem is the translation or interpretation of " rev­
olution" in recent Burmese politics. Jacob's and Taylor's contributions point to a pro­
cess which is in some respects the antithesis of Demaine's Thai example . Whereas in 
the Thai ins tance the focus is on an internal Thai discussion of "development" in the 
context of Western conceptual trends and of the political complexities of the country, 
the Burmese and Khmer studies note the purposeful attempts of the indigenous 
authorities to seek to avoid foreign control, or models. in this and other regards. 
In both Cambodia and Burma, political elites were at pains to create what Parkin 
has called an " internal cultural debate."" The point of focusing on a debate defined in 
this manner is that its effects are singularl y political. " Internal" implies a legitimate 
forum, from which others a re excluded; "cultural" gives the proceedings an airof iden­
tity and asserts the existence of culture: "debate" suggests that conflicts are construc­
tive and do not threaten the proposed boundaries or definition of the culture . Parkin 
implies this is a s trategy adopted by a people who feel concern at being swamped by 
influences represented as external. Of course, should one party in the internal debate 
gain sufficient control over the state appa ra tus, it is likely to try to steer the future evo­
lution of the debate by asserting, in indigenous terms. the "right," or "real ," meaning 
of political language. The results, however, may be surprising, because such strategies 
are usually based on a naive vision of language , One might add that the identification 
of a political group with "the people," "the culture." or "the state," and the construc­
tions placed upon conceptions like the state itself, a re claims which are part of this 
notional debate. Before we consider such debates, we should note the extent to which 
the parameters of discussion are already preempted. 
The problems confronting revolutionary nationalis t groups in Burma before and 
after independence from colonial rule included how to presen t to their intended audi­
ence the kind of radical change they wished to bring about. Taylor shows how, for aspi­
rants to power, the image of revolution was designed to give form to an idea of moral 
and social change; and how, for incumbents, it was used to justify state policy. He fur­
ther notes that: 
Since 1948, however, the concept of revolution has become the metaphor which 
leaders who intend not only to control but to transform radically the nature of the 
polity use to convey to their followers the essence of political purpose. 
As Taylor develops clearly the implications behind the changing notions of revolution, 
I need only make two small points about his argument here . The assertion that an idea 
or concept has an essential meaning introduces questions of power, If this is claimed 
by an aspiring elite, the implication is that it is they, rather than any alternative elite, 
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who are qualified to state what the essential truth is, and thereby claim that others 
must follow their interpretations and orders." Further, the transformation of a term 
like "revolution" to the status of a key metaphor in political argument is significant. For 
metaphors represent neither accurately nor fully-they portray something as some­
thing else. In other words they are persuasive rather than descriptive . In this way Tay­
lor introduces us to the complex functions of political language . It is emotive in so far 
as it suggests the speaker's attitude to what he or she is saying; it is conative in so far 
as it implies appropriate action; it is assertive in so far as it claims to portray how things 
reallyare. 16 
The different ways in which words can mean things comes out clearly in the his­
tory of Burmese expressions for revolution. Significantly, at the start Marxist thinkers 
did not worry about the issue, which only became important as sectarian connicts 
grew. For the democratic socialists the preferred expression, ayci-daw-boll, came to indi­
cate "a people's movement" rather than "a revolution to overthrow established author­
ity and to redistribute values and power," the latter being encapsulated in the less well­
rooted phrase law-itiall-Yiii. Where the former included a "struggle for power" among 
its senses, the latter implied treating "a superior with dis respect Or insolence, to be in 
rebellion." In creating neologisms with different connotations, the politicians drew on 
existing semant ic uses, but in such a way as to constitute a discourse which at times 
undermined their Ow n role s and their attempts to restructure popular perceptions of 
the state and its functions. 
Once again we are back not just to what words "mean" but what people do in 
using them. The critical point in the shift from a theory of connotation and denotation 
to one of reference is that one now focuses not on an elusive eternal, and essential, 
meaning but on the ways in which people use language in different contexts with vary­
ing effects. As Taylor suggests, to ask out of context what revolution is is largely mean­
ingless. 
If Burma's political leaders exerted conscious control over the kinds of picture they 
wished to present of themselves and their aims, they seem to have had less control over 
other aspects of their ideas. Revolution is not a concept in vaCtio. It has its own context 
of ideas, and relates to such issues as views of history, human nature, and the relations 
between human beings and society. The two socialist factions found themselves argu­
ing implicitly, but conSistently, for radically different views of the world. Whether these 
wider issues are presupposed, rather than entailed, in the Burmese ins tance is not the 
immediate point:" from the evidence presented , it would seem that Buddhist ideas of 
time were presupposed, the nature of human beings entailed. What is relevant how­
ever is the extent to which we mislead ourselves in lookingat "symbolism" (here a con­
sCiously constructed one at that) rather than at the implications ideas have for one 
another and the extent to which people find it necessary to appeal to such general 
issues as history, society and human nature in the course of political and daily life. 
McVey's paper also deals with the problems of introd ucing alien ideologies to 
indigenous populations. But where in Burma the debate was between rival views of 
revolution, in Java the discussion focused on how far Marxism should adapt to existing, 
and seemingly well entrenched, cultural ideas, enshrined in part in the Javanese 
shadow play. Perhaps because of Indonesia's sheer size and diversity, the problems of 
the Communist Party (PKI) were less with translating foreign imports into culturally 
acceptable form (although those existed too) as with overlapping, and incompatible, 
identities. For, while Java is politically and demographically the dominant island in the 
archipelago, other large islands like Sumatra are economically important and are 
locked in the struggle for na tional innuence . Cultural, ethnic, religious, and political 
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differences mesh in an intricate kaleidoscope, and make the formation of coherent 
mass movements extremely difficult. McVey looks at the complex implications of being 
simultaneously Javanese and Communist and shows how far the two paradigms were 
incompatible, not just at the level of formal ideological postulates, but in their philo­
sophical assumptions. 
The puzzle with which McVey starts is why a leading Communist, in his last public 
statement, should identify himself and his colleagues with the "feudal" heroes of the 
Mahabharata , the epic on which most shadow play (wayal1g) is based. She observes 
that : 
there is a deep difference between the philosophical vision of Marxism and the 
classical shadow-play. Wayal1g teaches that contradictions are not overcome; they 
may only be understood and thereby borne .. . (whereas) in Marxist thought, his­
tory is the process of man's realization of himself. ... Marxism is optimistic where 
wayang is not; Marxism teaches that understanding dictates struggle, waynllg that 
it enjoins acceptance. 
Marxism and shadow theater embody radically different views of social history, con­
flict and the human condition. In the world portrayed by the shadow theatre, the past 
is purer and so serves to suggest precedents, " for in its vision all time coexists." In 
Marxism, on the other hand, the past is something to be transcended. History is pic­
tured in both views by a spatial metaphor of " direction ." But one looks back, the other 
forward . 
One of the assumptions in much Marxist theory is that its assertions reflect and 
correspond to dialectically changing states of affairs in the world, both past and future. 
Otherwise it would be incapable of the generalization beyond immediate context which 
its predictions of historical inevitability require. In practice, however, Marxism adapts. 
Apart from being a timely reminder that we need to contextualize general terms like 
"Marxism," this observation highlights an interesting problem encountered by the 
Javanese Communist elite (and other Western-derived ideological groupings too). The 
difficulty was that there was a disjuncture between the image of the Common Man, in 
the abstract, and what actual common men tended to do. 
The Javanese seem to have set about ordering their relations with cultural ideals 
quite differently. As McVey writes: 
the inclination of Javanese (is) to see individuals and events in terms of wnyallg 
characters and lakon (plays) and to choose as exemplars for themselves those wa­
yallg figures perceived to be most in accordance with each perceiver's character 
and situation . 
Here interpretation is doubly contextual: both according to the specific situation and 
according to what is seen as fitting for one's personality. The confrontation of Marxism 
and Javanese culture is not between two symmetrical ideologies or paradigms, as in the 
Burmese political debate, but between two quite different kinds of metaphysical sys­
tem, articulated in terms of different theories of meaning and truth. 
The question still remains of whether or not we should attribute the importance of 
shadow theater in Java to its capacity to provide the constituent, or meaningful, sym­
bolism of Javanese life . So phrased the question skews discussion n priori. To suppose 
that the need to understand and order the incomprehensible through symbols is fun­
damental to human nature begs the question . The intricate polysemy which the 
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Javanese seem to enjoy so much may be described in terms other than symbolism. 
There is something to be said, if only for a change of perspective, fo r thinking in terms 
of a notion like " text," where this is understood not as a particular work but as field of 
possibilities permitted at any time by the presuppositions and ideas of style of those 
who produce (here puppeteers), and those who watch, a play. 
Other peoples' kinds of textuality may differ from Ours and we are only too liable 
to misunderstand what the words that are created say and do (as many who have 
wished to mold shadow theater have found to their cost) . We tend to assume that lan­
guage is there to communicate some truth about the world, whereas it may just as well 
be seen as instantiating, exemplifying, or hinting at, the ineffable." Reference is only a 
part of what shadow plays do. The language permits plays On homonymy and folk 
etymology, and the use of Javanese is valued as a unique and differentiating code . 
Shadow theater also provides a paradigm of the nature of reality; it serves as a reflexive 
commentary on Javanese life and customs, as well as on the nature of language and 
human beings. " Rather than being a transparent medium, language in Java, and a for­
tiori the shadow play, provide a reservoir of terms and situations which have been pre­
constrained by previous use and in terms of which new situations may be ordered. By 
the same token, new uses modify the appropriateness of established signs. The prob­
lem in understanding wayang stems from imposing alien ideas of communication on a 
set of practices which are far from fully studied. 
How intricate cultural conventions of textuality may be comes out in Davidson's 
detailed analysis of the dialogue between two Vietnamese poets at the time the French 
were striving to extend their pOlitical control over the country. One scholar and poet, 
Ton Tho Tuong, had sided with the colonialist s. In a famous poem, 11, Thllat ("Being 
Autobiographical"), he set out to justify his allegiance and to persuade others to follow 
him. His verses were capped by a more patriotic and, as it turned out, a subtler poet, 
Phan Van Tri, in a long exchange. which was at once literary and political. For under 
discussion were the moral duties of scholar-bureaucrats, ideas about what it meant to 
be Vietnamese, a confrontation between the ideals and practice of Confucianism and 
political modernism, and much else besides. Where Javanese shadow plays must reach 
their audience in a largely ad lib performance On a single night , no such constraints 
operated on these poetic exchanges and so they show the full complexity that literary 
and artistic forms may altain in Southeast Asia. 20 
Poetry is the Achilles heel of essentialist theories of language. For words and 
phrases do so much at anyone moment that it is vainglorious to try to say what it is that 
language is "really" about. "Meaning" here is the revealed intention of the poet, and 
the better the poem, the more it implies. One could run the gamut of the functions of 
language in the analysis of the Tuong-Tri poetic dialogue but it would only hint at a few 
of the tools they used; and one would be saying next to nothing about style and tex­
tuality. Nor is it easy to pin down the references of the poems. An allusive use of met­
aphor can suggest an open set of possible contexts, some of them as yet unrealized . So 
Davidson concludes with two prophetic lines of Phan Van Tri suggesting that an idea 
which seemed doubtful when penned, could turn out more powerful and percipient 
than the gun boats that had served so often as metaphors at the beginning of their 
poetic dialogue: 
The nation, one tomorrow, will change its destiny to one of peace, 
The South in common will enjoy reunion in peaceful equilibrium. 
In passing one might note the connection between metaphor and context, and why 
poetry is so hard to classify linguistically. What a sentence denotes (sentence meaning) 
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is different analytically from what it is used to refer to on a given occasion (utterance 
meaning). So context is already relevant to understanding exchanges like the poets' 
dialogue. Even in literal sentences, where arguably the sentence and the speaker's 
meaning coincide, "the sentence only determines a definite set of truth conditions rel­
ative to a particular context."21 On this view context cannot be eliminated from even 
simple description. 
How metaphor works is a much disputed topic, but by most accounts it involves 
the existence of one or more contexts beyond that implied in the sentence meaning; and 
what it hints at is usually reached by considering the full context of the utterance. 
Guessing what someone "has in mind" is a tricky business because of the amount of 
information needed, and because people vary in their allusive skills. So metaphor 
resists attempts to circumscribe its potential range of implications and its contexts of 
application." 
To gauge just how contexts are alluded to in much discourse, the reader can do no 
better than to follow Davidson in his unravelling of the stanzas of the poets' exchanges. 
For example, at one point Phan Van Tri compares Ton Tuo Tuong to an opera actor. In 
one phrase he draws upon actors' duplicitous reputations and unfitness for high 
bureaucratic office, takes a sideswipe at the nobility among whom opera was popular, 
and opens the way for an extended double play between actors on stage and Tuong 
in politics. 
Another important aspect of metaphor is the stress it allows on perspective. By 
viewing one situation in terms of another, it permits parallels to be asserted in a fluid 
classificatory field. The argument between Ton Tho Tuong and Phan Van Tri was 
whether the former was a true patriot in urging collaboration with a formidable foreign 
state, so as to learn the secrets of its power, or whether he was simply an opportunist 
and traitor. Through the sustained use of metaphor Tuong sought similarities in the 
classical literature to his actions; while Tri, playing on homonymy and the different 
potential contexts of key words, offered a radically different perspective. The situation 
as such offered no c1earcut interpretation. Determining its nature depended on the 
rival poets' deployment of comparison and contrast, and their implications. Metaphor 
here is political: and it was in part through Tri's greater skill and subtlety in matching 
and rephrasing Tuong's claims that his view came to be accepted. 
Furthermore, poetic dialogues in Vietnam were not a rarified communion 
between scholars of little relevance to anything else. Where we tend to treat power and 
poetry as antithetical and substantively different, the Vietnamese did not. Davidson 
remarks that "in Vietnam, poetry and politics have never been very far apart." Not 
only were the literati in charge of the country's administration, so that power under­
wrote knowledge and knowledge power; but what kinds of power there were, and how 
they were to be managed were delineated by discursive rules. For it was expertise in 
Confucian texts which defined a person as fit for power and also defined what powers 
were recognized. 
My own essay discusses explicitly the relation of meaning, context and power. It 
considers how the definition of context in Bali turns on questions of power. This point 
leads to an examination of the theories of human nature which observers have imputed 
to the Balinese to explain their culture and actions; and how the Balinese represent the 
position in quite different-and incommensurate-ways. I suggest that most 
accounts, whether they see the Balinese as "constructing," "dramatizing," or "nego­
tiating" their culture are prima facie wrong, because the models of human nature 
invoked are quite alien to those the Balinese themselves use in accounting for their 
actions. 
All the contribu tors are concerned to avoid grand generaliza tions of the kind 
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which positivism made popular. Theorizing is the easier the less one knows about the 
history and culture of the people under study. Detailed knowledge of context is vital to 
an understanding of the kinds of issues with which we are interested. Part of the rele­
vance of context in Southeast Asia arises from the weakness of correspondence theo­
ries of truth and meaning which, my essay suggests, may also be alien to at least one 
such society's style of argument. lt is true that one drawback of coherence, or contex­
tual. theories is that they make it hard to generalize. This difficulty may be no bad thing 
if we consider how far the alternatives have led to hypostatizing what happens and 
turning labels into realities. 
Correspondence theory rests on a referential view of language which the authors 
in this book show to be inadequate for finely detailed research. The theory presup­
poses the existence of essences in things, events or states, such that words can depict, 
or denote, what is relevant or essential with reasonable accuracy. It is far from clear, 
however, that the peoples we are discussing share this view of language and the world. 
In any case, culture is not a "thing": it is asserted, challenged, and misunderstood by 
people on different occasions. The stress on metaphor in several of the essays is a way 
of looking at how language is used in actual situations. The link is at once semantic and 
political. People recognize different styles of argument and ways of producing texts; 
and knowledge is not just power to influence interpretations but also the ability to 
state, or even instantiate, whatever culture is, or what the correct context should be. 
lt is the potentially infinite range of relevant contexts which makes it so hard to 
define their implications in practice. The contributors, however, have attempted, more 
or less directly, to explore at least some of the possibilities suggested by the interplay of 
semantic contexts and sociat political, and other situations. 1,' 
The degree to which ascertaining, or arguing, the relevant context is a matter of 
daily concern is discussed in my own contribution. Even so apparently simple a matter 
as the jural definition of "the village" depends upon context, in the sense that different 
interest groups may argue for the relevance of different sets of relationships. The abil­
ity to interpret events by defining what kind of situation is at stake and what ties are 
germane is a vital part of all political activity in Bali. We often take too narrow a view of 
power by confining it to the mobilizing of support for winning confrontations. Yet to be 
able to classify how events are to be considered, i.e., the relevant context, is crucial in 
political power in Bali and probably elsewhere. 
It is, of course, also possible to discover, or invent, new ideas and uses of power: 
definitions of new offenses against the state or person, positing extended areas of per­
sonal responsibility (over sexuality, one's intentions and so on) or simply refined tech­
niques of surveillance." Part of the difficulty in seeing the part which knowledge plays 
in forming (new) power comes from our tendency to regard the terms as denoting quite 
different sorts of substantive entities. 
Strictly speaking, then, the title of this book might refer simply to contexts and 
meanings." It is of little import so long as it is clear the words are simply labels for kinds 
of relationships. Each of the contributors has been looking at the ways in which mean­
ings and powers are recognized and incorporated Oacob), argued over (Taylor, McYey), 
reinterpreted (Demaine), and constituted or expressed in different forms (Davidson, 
Hobart). We are not talking about meaning as being some separate realm, intuited 
through symbols or enshrined only in language; nor is power conceived of as linked 
exclusively to the state, law, violence, and so on. Besides these phenomena there are 
other powers which may be summoned up and bring complexity, uncertainty, and 
potentiality to people's lives. After all, in some circumstances a grasp of meanings is a 
form of power, while powers are culturally celebrated and challenged in poetry, thea­
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ter, and everyday life. And new possibilities always threaten to disturb the comfortable 
predictions of scholars. 
What categories like religion, theater, and literature have in common is that they 
are about knowledge, a knowledge which is made manifest or attains its potentiality by 
people using it in diffe rent contexts . Neither knowledge, mea ning, nor power exist in 
vi/reo. If knowledge concerns the potentialities of situations, power may usefully be 
seen as the uses, or exemplifications, o f such potentialities. In a way, knowledge and 
power are two aspects of the same kinds of process, or better the sa me process seen 
from two different perspectives. So perhaps it is fitting that the provenance of this 
book, its context if you like, is an institution whose motto is: 
KNOWLEDGE IS POWER 
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